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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004125

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/16/2015

TAGS: [PREL](#) [CY](#) [TU](#)

SUBJECT: TURKEY, UK PRESIDENCY AGREE ON ANKARA AGREEMENT
EXTENSION PROTOCOL MODALITY

REF: A. ANKARA 3890

[1](#)B. 14 JULY 2005 BLAHA E-MAILS

[1](#)C. ANKARA 1856

(U) Classified by Political Counselor John Kunstadter, E.O.
12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

[1](#)1. (C) Summary: According to the UK Embassy. the GOT and the UK Presidency agreed July 15 on the modality by which Turkey will sign the Ankara Agreement extension protocol. The UK will announce the agreement on modality at the July 18 GAERC and expects the signing process to begin shortly thereafter. The text of the declaration the GOT will issue that its signature does not constitute recognition of the Republic of Cyprus (ROC) remains unknown, and could trigger a sharp reaction from the EU if it is not moderate. End Summary.

Agreement on Modality

[1](#)2. (C) The last roadblock to Turkish extension of the Ankara Agreement to the ten new EU members was the modality by which it would occur. UK PolChief Miller and MFA Northeast Mediterranean A/DDG Bilman both told us the GOT wanted an exchange of letters without an actual signing in order to blunt domestic criticism that a signature constitutes recognition and to keep the event as low-key as possible. The UK Presidency was firm that the enough members states would insist that the December Summit conclusions require an actual signature to make the GOT's proposal non-viable.

[1](#)3. (C) According to Miller, following July 14 meetings in Ankara between Turkish MFA officials and FCO Med/Europe Director Chilcott, the two sides came to a compromise agreement that the GOT will sign the protocol (the text was agreed to in March - see ref C) through an exchange of letters. FM Gul personally approved the modality July 15. The UK EU PermRep (and perhaps a Commission official) will sign the protocol and send it with a cover letter to Turkey; the Turkish PermRep will send back the protocol with his signature as well, attaching a GOT declaration that the signature does not constitute recognition of the ROC.

[1](#)4. (C) The UK will announce the agreed mechanism at the July 18 GAERC. Miller told us the UK will finesse the timing so that the letter exchange commences after the GAERC. The UK wants the GOT declaration to become public only after the GAERC in order to avoid the GAERC getting wrapped up in a discussion of it.

Now, the Other Shoe: Turkey's Non-Recognition Declaration

[1](#)5. (C) While agreement on the modality clears the way for the GOT to sign the protocol, the accompanying Turkish non-recognition declaration poses the next problem. Domestic criticism is pushing the GOT toward tough non-recognition language that could cause members states to question whether the GOT intends to implement the protocol, or even whether the GOT's signature has meaning (ref A).

[1](#)6. (C) The GOT still has not shared its proposed declaration text with anyone, not even the UK. Miller told us that during the July 18 meetings, MFA Europe Deputy U/S Bozkir told the UK the MFA Cyprus Department is keeping the text so close-hold that although he has seen it, even he does not have a copy.

[1](#)7. (C) Turkish MFA officials assure the UK -- and us -- that the declaration text will contain no surprises, "nothing that has not already been said." They say it will contain positive elements, including expression of the GOT's willingness to find a comprehensive Cyprus solution. Nevertheless, they continue to hint it will refer to the GOT's May 2004 statement upon the accession of the ten new members, including the ROC, a statement that Commission officials here view negatively.

[1](#)8. (C) Depending on the language of the GOT declaration, Miller tells us the UK Presidency may be compelled to issue a counter-declaration. The Turkish MFA is worried the ROC could use a counter-declaration to argue "back door recognition" by Turkey.

Negotiation Framework for Turkey

9. (C) The GOT and UK also discussed on July 14 Cyprus and Aegean-related portions of the Negotiation Framework for Turkey. Among other things, Bilman said the MFA argued that saying that Turkey should "support...steps to contribute to a favorable environment for comprehensive (Cyprus) settlement" turn Cyprus settlement into a condition for membership and place all the onus on Turkey, paving the way for endless Greek Cypriot demands. FM Gul will have difficulty defending the Framework text, the MFA asserted.

10. (C) Chilcott told the MFA officials they are misreading the text and overplaying concerns. He reminded the Turks the Framework is a list of EU demands on a candidate, not a Turkish document. Chilcott warned the MFA not to expect any improvement in the text; indeed, the UK will have to expend effort to prevent the text from becoming too much tougher.

FM Gul Feels Disillusioned, Isolated on EU

11. (C) Miller told us that FM Gul was downbeat on the EU during a July 13 plane ride from London to Ankara with UK Ambassador Westmacott. Gul claimed he is disillusioned with the EU process and what he views as excessive EU demands on Turkey. Bozkir told Westmacott July 14 that Gul feels isolated in the cabinet on EU issues, implying he is the only one doing the heavy political lifting. Bozkir pointed noted that PM Erdogan has not attended an EU-related meeting since the December EU Summit.

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